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Introduction: Towards Professional Wisdom 
David Carr, Liz Bondi, Chris Clark and Cecelia Clegg 
The editors of this volume are professional colleagues to the extent of having been 
academic contemporaries in different schools and departments of the University of 
Edinburgh over the course of many years. They have all also been directly concerned, 
beyond the groves of academe, with the pre- and in-service education and training of 
practitioners for various fields of professional work such as (precisely in the case of these 
editors) education, social work, counselling and ministry. It is also probably little 
exaggeration to say that despite working in professional fields with common occupational 
interests and concerns, the present editors barely knew each other until a few years ago. 
Moreover, we suspect that this general state of affairs is not unusual in most major 
universities in Britain and more widely. 
The origins of the present volume may be traced back to a meeting between two 
editors following the discovery that both were working on much the same issues and 
problems of professional concern, albeit in rather different professional fields. One editor, 
exercised by the problem of how to understand the nature of professional deliberation and 
judgement in social work was alerted – ironically whilst on study leave at a university on 
the other side of the world – to the work of another editor working in his home university 
on much the same issues in the context of teacher education and training. It was soon 
apparent from the meeting following this discovery that professional fields such as 
education and social work, given their common concerns with general social welfare and 
health, could only stand to benefit from closer dialogue and cooperation between those bent 
on further understanding the character and effective conduct of such practices. Aside from 
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the scandal of academic apartheid between researchers working on similar issues and 
problems of professional practice in such relative academic isolation – particularly in 
contemporary contexts of professional policy-making in which practitioners are 
increasingly encouraged or required to work in closer collaboration – it is not very hard to 
see how reflection on the issues and problems in a field such as social work may be a 
potentially rich source of professional insight to teachers, and vice-versa.  
Indeed, it soon became clear that that the issues and problems that had brought 
together two editors of this volume were not just confined to education and social work, but 
common to a wide range of professional or quasi-professional occupations that have been 
variously referred to as ‘semi-professions’, ‘vocations’, ‘caring professions’ or (in the 
preferred terminology of many contributions to this volume) ‘people professions’. It was 
but a short further step from appreciating the common occupational concerns of education 
and social work to recognizing that such other occupations as (for example) counselling, 
ministry and nursing, raised and faced precisely analogous questions and problems. In 
particular, it was clear that these and other occupations are implicated in issues of human 
association, welfare and flourishing that engender complex and difficult questions about the 
nature and status in such contexts of effective professional reflection and deliberation: 
issues, precisely, about what might be said to constitute wise judgement and conduct in 
such fields.  
Towards clarification of such questions, we could start by asking how the 
professional reflection of teachers, social workers, counsellors, nurses and ministers might 
generally be distinguished from that of other human professions, trades or services. First, it 
seems to be widely agreed that the rational powers required for the effective pursuit of such 
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occupations might or should be regarded as forms of ‘practical reason’, procedural 
knowledge or ‘reflection in action’. That said, the precise logical form of such knowledge, 
reason or reflection is also a matter of lively debate, and it is to some of these disputes that 
the essays in the first part of this volume are addressed. Moreover, one key topic of debate 
in this connection is whether the knowledge or rational judgement required for the effective 
conduct of caring or people professions is reducible to the technical ‘evidence-based’ 
rationality to which modern professions as medicine seem sometimes to have aspired. 
There can be little question that the spectacular technical advances of modern medical 
science – no doubt reinforced by modern social scientific attempts to explain human 
behaviour in quasi-natural scientific terms – have encouraged general conceptions of 
professional practice as instruments or vehicles of social engineering. On such ‘scientistic’ 
views of professional practice, if the overall goals of human health, welfare and progress 
may be determined by rational scientific enquiry, and the means to such goals can be 
established by empirical research and experiment, then the desired goals might in principle 
be achieved by straightforward implementation of such identified means. There can be little 
doubt that education was widely so conceived in much influential twentieth-century 
educational theorising as a technology of pedagogy grounded in a (behavioural) science of 
learning.  
A key difficulty about any such conception of profession, however, is that it is far from 
clear that either social or natural science is well-placed to determine the goals of human 
welfare and flourishing. The basic problem is that questions of human welfare and 
flourishing appear to be located in the space of ‘value’ rather than (social or natural) fact 
and are as such – not least in western and other liberal and plural democracies – inevitably 
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and invariably contested.  While this is not of course to deny that values are either rational 
or objective, that sane and sensible values may need to be constrained by facts or evidence, 
or that there may be rationally better and/or worse ways of rationally resolving value 
disputes, it is to concede that the kind of enquiry appropriate to appraising values is 
primarily moral or ethical rather than scientific. Thus, in so far as ‘people professional’ 
deliberation is inevitably implicated in such value disputes it is arguably also more (or 
more centrally) moral or ethical than scientific – and, to be sure, it is now widely 
recognised that courses of education and training in such fields as education, nursing and 
social work might or should include a core ethical component.  
However, in so far as the nature of ethical or moral reflection, deliberation, 
judgement and conduct is also philosophically contested, this clearly raises no less complex 
issues about the precise direction that professional ethics should take, and about the 
consequent best course of ‘people professional’ education and training. Indeed, one key 
issue here – of enormous significance for professional judgement in people or caring 
professions – concerns the extent to which any morally correct or defensible professional 
judgement may be expressed in the form of well-defined rules or principles of the kind 
found in the ethics of deontology and utilitarianism, and which are also the staple fare of 
much official professional policy and regulation. In this connection, some moral 
philosophers and theorists of professional ethics have inclined to a perspective known 
generally as ‘ethical particularism’ which effectively denies, given the highly situation-
specific or context-sensitive character of moral thought and/or judgement, that such thought 
is at all susceptible to such regulation or codification. However, although particularism 
usually cites the authority and support of Aristotle (or of ancient and/or modern Aristotelian 
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virtue ethics), and though Aristotle clearly did hold that the virtuous moral response should 
be a matter of particular context-sensitive judgement, it is no less clear that he also 
explicitly subscribed to general moral rules and principles and saw particular moral 
judgements as nevertheless dependent upon some framework of such principles. In this 
regard, it probably makes best sense to observe some Aristotelian ‘mean’ between the more 
uncompromising moral regulation of deontic ethics and the more radical rejection of moral 
rules of latter day particularists. (More modest forms of particularism are defended by some 
contributors to this volume; but for criticisms of radical particularism, see Luntley, this 
volume, and Kristjánsson 2007, 2010.) Nevertheless, it is clear enough that such ‘people 
(and other) professional’ occupations as teaching, social work and nursing do require 
practitioners to make highly particular context-sensitive judgments in the course of their 
work, and that any ethics for such professions would need to include an adequate account 
of the logical grounds of such judgements. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the kind of virtue-theoretical perspective that is 
often enlisted in support of (radical or moderate) ethical particularism parts company with 
the moral rationalism of deontic ethics (the ethics of duty and utility) by insisting that 
genuine or full moral (virtuous) judgements or responses are by no means exclusively 
matters of reason or cognition – or at least of reason as cognitively conceived.  For past and 
present virtue ethicists, virtues are dispositions to moral conduct that are no less affective 
than cognitive. Indeed, as one editor of this volume has elsewhere expressed this (Carr 
2009), the virtues of virtue ethics are more or less equivalent to states of emotion, feeling or 
appetite ordered in accordance with some deliberative ideal of practical wisdom.  But if 
moral (virtuous) responses and judgements are construed in this affectively grounded way, 
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then this would seem to have consequences for those human occupations – such as, 
precisely, the ‘people professions’ – in which the emotional dimensions of human 
association are significantly implicated. Indeed, while some perspectives on professional 
ethics seem to have supposed that professional relations should always be ‘impersonal’ or 
‘disinterested’ and seek to eschew the emotional involvements or attachments that might 
lead to bias or other distorted judgement, it seems rather more intuitive to suppose that 
good social workers need to be sympathetic to clients, that good nurses need to be caring of 
patients and that good teachers need to be capable of warm and supportive relations with 
pupils. Virtue ethics can generally (and arguably better than other moral theories) be 
pressed in support of this more intuitively plausible view of the professional value of 
properly ordered feeling and emotion. So far; so good. But this also raises difficult 
questions and issues – some of which are addressed in the second section of this volume – 
about how such affective qualities might be developed, fostered and monitored in the 
education and training of ‘people professionals’.  
This present volume addresses, directly or indirectly, all of these aforementioned 
questions, issues and problems about the nature of reflection and conduct in people 
professions. The volume has its origins in a successful and internationally well-attended 
University of Edinburgh conference, entitled ‘Towards professional wisdom: practical 
deliberation in the “people professions”’, organized and mounted by the editors in March 
2008. The main aim of that conference was to encourage interdisciplinary dialogue on 
issues of common concern to a wide variety of professional fields such as education, social 
work, counselling, nursing and ministry. The conference set out to focus mainly on issues 
and problems concerning the character of deliberation and judgement in such ‘people 
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professions’, specifically with a view to exploring the possibility that such occupations 
require the development of special kind of reflection or deliberation (perhaps along the 
lines of Aristotle’s phronesis or practical wisdom). In the event, however, the conference 
also addressed such related but widely ranging issues as: the impact of official prescription 
and regulation on professional judgement; conflicts of professional judgement and 
public/political accountability; tensions between universal justice and equality and 
particular client need; the limits of professional concern for the personal problems of 
clients; the extent to which ‘people professional’ practice is grounded in theory; alternative 
models of professional deliberation to ‘technical rationality’; the role of emotion and affect 
in ‘people professional’ practice; the possibility of non-scientific (narrative) sources of 
professional wisdom; and the role of the supervisor in the training and practice of people 
professionals.   
In the wake of this meeting and the widespread professional interest that it 
provoked, the present editors decided that there would be much academic and professional 
value and merit in assembling a collection of invited essays on this wider range of 
conference themes: that, indeed, there seemed to be a quite regrettable gap in the literature 
of professional issues for work specifically addressed to such ‘people-professional’ themes 
in an appropriately inter-disciplinary and cross-professional way. Contributions were 
commissioned from a broad constituency of distinguished scholars in the fields of 
professional ethics and expertise from relevant ‘people-professional’ backgrounds and a 
wide range of academic disciplines such as philosophy, theology, politics, sociology and 
psychology (also see Clark et al. 2009). The second half of this introduction will therefore 
provide brief resumes of the fifteen contributory chapters to the present volume.  
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*** 
The first part of the collection investigates the nature of knowing and deliberation in 
practice. The professions have an ambivalent relationship with technical and scientific 
knowledge: while it is universally acknowledged as the prime distinguishing and 
legitimating characteristic of modern professionals, it is much less clear that the whole of 
the professional’s wisdom and skill in deliberating over difficult cases can be encompassed 
within the realm of scientifically validated technical expertise. 
In chapter 2 Joseph Dunne contrasts the technical rationality that informs productive 
activities with the practical wisdom, derived from the Aristotelian phronesis, essential to 
effective engagement in human affairs. Members of a community of practice are committed 
to its characteristic outcomes; to sustain that commitment they nurture the characteristic 
capabilities or virtues of the practice. While the capabilities of a practice are both technical 
and practical, it follows from Dunne’s exegesis that the cardinal virtue of people practices 
must be wise judgement or phronesis. The practically wise professional employs a capacity 
for engaged understanding and discerning judgement; she is able to distinguish unusual 
situations from everyday concerns and respond appropriately, mediating with generalities 
while always respecting the particularity of the case.  
Michael Luntley, in chapter 3, challenges the widespread supposition – previously 
exemplified by Dunne in the preceding chapter with the common notion that the potter has 
‘know-how in his hands that is irrecoverable in any explicit propositions’ (page xx) - that 
the knowledge of expert practitioners is somehow different in kind from the ordinarily 
recognised knowledge expressible in propositions.  Luntley expands the concept of a 
proposition, arguing that propositional knowledge is no less than such merely because it 
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resists precise articulation or codification. He further maintains that it is not the thought-
processes of the expert that represent extraordinary skill and judgement in response to 
difficult or unusual problems; on the contrary, it is the special procedures and knowledge 
application attributed to the novice that are extraordinary. 
In chapter 4 Chris Clark further explores the reach and limits of technical rationality 
by examining ‘evidence-based practice’, now widely promulgated as the necessary and sole 
legitimate foundation of good practice in a growing range of human services. 
Notwithstanding its superficial attraction, evidence-based practice has in actuality been 
founded on a narrowly positivist conception of scientific evidence. Considering knowing 
for practice, Clark distinguishes actors’ background knowledge, whose content they are 
normally largely unaware of, from the foreground tools, both conceptual and tangible, that 
they consciously employ to carry out a task. Evidence-based practice may be a helpful 
source of foreground tools but fails entirely to ground the broader process of practical 
reasoning, or the practical wisdom which distinguishes the deeply experienced 
professional. 
Daniel Vokey and Jeannie Kerr, in chapter 5, carry the discussion of practical 
reasoning into the arena of moral choices. They question the reliability of moral decision-
making and ask what might serve as evidence of learning by students of the capacity to 
make better moral choices. Noting that moral decision-making commonly occurs in 
contexts of complexity that cannot be conclusively addressed by standard inferential 
reasoning, they argue that we must posit forms of non-inferential cognition, including 
moral intuition and moral judgement. Vokey and Kerr draw on Haidt’s (2001) social 
intuitionist model of moral judgement that emphasises the priority of felt apprehensions 
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over logical reasoning. They identify discernment – the proper mean between rashness and 
timidity in moral judgment – as the capacity needed to meet the challenge of complexity.  
In the final chapter of this section of the work addressed to issues of professional 
deliberation, Elizabeth Campbell also probes what is needed for preparing students of 
education to show appropriate moral example and engage in effective ethical deliberation in 
their eventual professional practice. In her own research, students appeared barely 
conversant with normative ethical standards, but did tend to remember rules or prohibitions 
pertaining to notorious but rare infractions. They were particularly impressed by their 
negative experiences of the unethical practice of their supervising teachers. Campbell notes 
that while the development of moral and ethical judgement mostly occurs before entering 
training, real understanding of professional issues only develops as the fruit of professional 
experience. All the same, she argues that there is a case for more explicit and focused pre-
service teaching of professional ethics. 
The second part of the volume takes up questions about the personal and affective 
dimensions of professional engagement. For some in the people professions, emotional 
connections with others are a key reward of their work. But is such emotional involvement 
wise? How can the requirement for professionals to treat their ‘clients’ impartially be 
combined with the inevitably personal nature of their interaction with those for whom they 
care or those whose development they seek to facilitate? How do we equip professionals to 
manage the emotional nature of their work? What expectations do we hold about how we 
engage with our own and others emotional experiences of professional relationships? Part 2 
addresses such questions and explores ways in which wise personal and affective 
engagement might be thought about and developed in professional practice. 
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In chapter 7, David Carr explores the relationship between the personal and the 
interpersonal in ‘people professional’ relationships philosophically and conceptually. He 
argues that some of the philosophical trouble arises from conceptual confusion between the 
terms ‘impartial’ and ‘impersonal’. But even if impartiality need not be equated with 
impersonal forms of behaviour, prevailing deontological approaches to professional ethics 
provide no satisfactory guidance in relation to emotional engagement within professional 
practice. He therefore turns to two possible alternatives: the ethics of care and Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. As he explains, the latter places better emphasis on the moral character 
required of professionals and the importance of its cultivation in the training, practice and 
ethical frameworks of people professionals. 
In chapter 8, Kristján Kristjánsson picks up on questions concerning the moral 
character of professionals, with a particular focus on schoolteachers, noting the recent 
proliferation of studies of teachers’ professional identities and the emotional dimension of 
teaching. He argues that the literature on both issues has become saddled with what he calls 
the ‘constructivist-cognitive’ paradigm, according to which agents, including teachers and 
other professionals, have multiple identities but no actual selves, and emotions are 
understood either as non-cognitive thrusts or as exercises of social power. He exposes the 
weaknesses of this paradigm, and paves the way for an Aristotle-inspired alternative. 
Historically, one aspect of identity of particular relevance to the composition and 
character of professions has been gender. The growth of the people professions has been 
associated with what is sometimes called the ‘feminisation’ of professions. In chapter 9, Liz 
Bondi explores the natures of these trends and poses questions about the impact of gender 
on what we understand by professional wisdom. Using debates about emotion as an 
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example, she shows how ideas about ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ attributes and orientations 
continue to impact upon the value accorded to different aspects of professional wisdom. 
Work is where many of us live for many hours a day and yet the emotional 
importance of work in people’s live is often downplayed. In chapter 10, Susie Orbach 
argues for greater emotional literacy at work, focusing on professions for which 
relationships with others are key. Her account explores questions of the underlying 
motivations that draw people into these professions and offers concepts from 
psychoanalysis to help us think about and manage the emotional dilemmas we face at work. 
She concludes by using the Jungian concept of the shadow, which posits that there are 
always forces at work that seek to undo or do the opposite of our conscious intent and the 
overt intentions of the organisations in which we work.  
In chapter 11, which concludes part 2, John Swinton argues that imagination is a 
vital ingredient of professional wisdom, which he considers needs to be combined with the 
idea of practitioners in the people professions serving as guides and healers to individuals, 
particularly in times of personal crisis. In this context he explores the wisdom of L’Arche 
communities, which offer support for people with learning disabilities based on Jean 
Vanier’s (1999) The Way of the Heart. As he shows, this approach is not simply another 
mode of caring for people but is a way of being with and learning from people with 
intellectual disabilities. As a form of professional wisdom it requires us to think in new 
ways about the relevance of friendship. 
The third section of the book addresses often complex issues around the effect of 
legislation and regulation on professional judgement; the ways both positive and negative 
in which the demands of the state or of professional bodies impact on how professionals 
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deliberate and decide. There are contributions to this section from the fields of social work, 
counselling, ministry and social policy. 
In chapter 12, Sue White notes the disparity between the way clinicians often 
display uncertainty about technologies and their own diagnoses and the way social workers 
and practitioners are much less equivocal in offering opinions about human relationships. 
She uses ethnographic research conducted in children’s departments in England and Wales 
to illustrate the effect of a raft of government reforms, particularly the e-enabled assessment 
instruments which are, she argues, pushing social workers towards precipitous 
categorisations and action. 
In the next chapter, Kathleen Marshall and Maggie Mellon draw on research by the 
office of the Scottish Commissioner for Children and Young People to show how state 
regulation originally intended to protect children has led to paranoia and risk aversive 
behaviour in innocent adults. They graphically illustrate by means of three stories how the 
mechanisation of relationships between adults and children has developed, denying 
children the creative play that they need for development, and leaving adults searching for 
‘guidelines’ to follow that will exonerate them in the eyes of the media and society at large 
should things go wrong. We are, they argue, at risk of undermining healthy social 
relationships between adults and children – relationships that both children and adults need. 
The next two chapters address, from very different perspectives, the area of 
professional judgement in ministry. In chapter 14, Alison Elliot reflects on the way 
ministers have to negotiate the boundaries between voluntary, professional and business 
sectors whose attitudes and values are potentially in conflict. She explores how the concept 
of the psychological contract can bridge some of the differences. Illustrating her argument 
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from research on a faith-based project about homelessness she demonstrates that reflective 
ministerial practice can be remarkably robust in navigating the challenges of voluntary 
action in the present culture of regulation. 
In chapter 15, Cecelia Clegg assesses the lack of accountability in the profession of 
ministry that has, until the middle of this decade, managed to avoid professionalisation and 
regulation. Noting that the practitioner is the main ‘tool’ in ministry she argues that pastoral 
supervision must be a major element in developing wise practice. This is especially true in 
light of the particular features of pastoral ministry, in terms of the movement of the Spirit 
and making religious truth claims, which both require accountability and discernment if 
they are to be lived positively. With the formation of the Association of Pastoral 
Supervisors and Educators (APSE) in 2008 and the subsequent opening of a route for 
accrediting pastoral supervisors, there is now a formal structure to underpin and encourage 
the practise of pastoral supervision – one in which she contends the churches must invest. 
The closing contribution of the collection is made by Nick Totton who, in a 
provocative essay, argues that good therapy cannot also be ‘safe’. He contrasts the 
emphasis on boundaries with creativity and relationship, claiming that therapy should not 
be domesticated but wild. He laments the rise of the ‘normal’ practitioner and the re-
medicalisation of therapy driven by the rise in therapist numbers and hunger for status. He 
favours ‘local knowledge’ and ‘thick description’ over the primacy given to expert 
knowledge, contending that scientific research has shown that ‘neither technique nor 
training significantly affect the benefits reported’ (page xxx). Teasing out the current 
context in terms of a society that wants to control life, especially the unconscious, and to 
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alleviate suffering, he argues that individual psychotherapists and the psychotherapy 
profession must choose whether or not to stand against this fantasy. 
While the editors, as sometime contributors to the literature on these issues, have 
also seen fit to contribute invited chapters to this volume, they would like to express their 
especial thanks to the authors of invited contributions in this work.  It is largely due to these 
distinguished colleagues that the present volume has been able to present – so we believe – 
a wide range of quality pioneering essays on the nature of professionalism and professional 
practice from leaders in the field of contemporary reflection on these issues. In this regard, 
the editors have every confidence that the present volume will be of considerable academic 
and professional value to a wide professional clientele – including theorists of the 
professions, policy makers and practitioners – in such fields as teaching, social work, 
nursing, ministry, psychotherapy, counselling as well as other professions. 
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